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AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 
 ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Abstract. Recent analyses suggest that the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on developing 
countries will be very uneven. Simulations suggest that the effects of agricultural trade liberalization 
will be small, overall, and are likely to be negative for a significant number of developing countries. 
The Doha Round focuses on tariff issues, but these countries currently have practically duty-free 
access to European and North American markets under preferential regimes. Multilateral liberalization 
will erode the benefits of these preferences, which are presently rather well utilized in the agricultural 
sector. The main obstacles to the exports of the poorest countries appear to be in the non-tariff area 
(sanitary, phytosanitary standards) which increasingly originate from the private sector and are not 
dealt with under the Doha framework (traceability requirements, etc.). An agreement in Doha is 
unlikely to solve these problems and open large markets for the poorest countries. While this is not an 
argument to give up multilateral liberalization, a more specific and differentiated treatment should be 
considered in WTO rules, and corrective measures should be implemented. 
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AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 




Because developing countries' comparative advantage is seen to lie in agriculture, the protectionist 
agricultural policies in OECD countries are often alleged to prevent developing countries benefiting 
from world trade.  Indeed, many studies have provided optimistic estimates of the effects of 
agricultural liberalization on developing countries, suggesting that developing countries will reap most 
of the benefits from trade liberalization (Hertel et al 2003; World Bank 2004).  
However, the positive effects of the elimination of Northern agricultural subsidies might have been 
overestimated (Panagaryia, 2004).  The very large gains for developing countries predicted by some 
models have recently been criticized on the grounds that they are largely driven by a set of particular 
assumptions, and that excessive country aggregation hides the contrasting fortunes of the various 
developing countries (Bouët et al 2004c).  The fact that most modelers use the same set of data and 
parameters (i.e. data from the Global Analysis Trade Project) has encouraged an illusion of consensus 
regarding the benefits of trade liberalization.
1  
In this paper, we address the impact of the Doha multilateral negotiations on developing countries.  
We focus on areas where we compiled original data and instruments, such as the measurement of 
agricultural protection and farm subsidies in developed countries, the effect of trade preferences and 
the modeling of Northern agricultural policies.  We show that, the outcome of the Doha round is 
uncertain for many developing countries and that several crucial factors which will prevent some of 
the poorest countries from reaping benefits from the Doha Round have not been properly addressed.  
2. Agricultural protectionism in developed countries 
The agricultural protectionism of the Northern countries has long been denounced by developing 
countries.  However, the results of impact studies are contradictory, and reflect some of the agenda of 
the affected countries. For example, the Cairns Group and the United States emphasize the effects of 
"fortress Europe" on poor countries, while the European Commission stresses how the EU’s tariff 
structure allows it to import some eight times more agricultural foodstuffs from developing countries 
than Australia and United States combined. The Small Islands Developing States' analysis of US and 
EU protectionism is, on many aspects, orthogonal to the analysis made by Brazil or other Cairns group 
                                                      
1 This dataset did not include the preferential access to developed countries’ markets under preferential trade, 
and therefore led to overestimate the benefits of liberalization for developing countries. The 2005 release of a 
new version will solve some of the problems, and is likely to modify some earlier findings.  4
countries (FAO, 2004).  The actual measurement of the protection of the farm sector in OECD 
countries remains a matter of debate. 
The extent of agricultural protection. Technical difficulties have fuelled the controversy on the actual 
level of agricultural protection.  The simple measure of duty on agricultural products yields varying 
figures depending on the type of average used (trade weighted or not), and whether one focuses on 
bound tariffs or takes into account preferential tariffs. Bound tariffs negotiated at the WTO represent 
commitments on maximum tariffs.  However, in the case of the EU, of the 148 members of the WTO, 
only ten do not benefit from some form of preference. The others can export to the EU with reduced 
tariffs on at least certain products.  The United States also has numerous preferential regimes, arising 
either from free trade agreements or in the framework of non-reciprocal regimes (African Growth 
Opportunity Act –AGOA, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, etc.).  Moreover, every 
developed country grants preferences within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) and many under tariff quotas. It is only recently that reliable data bases have been constructed 
to show the totality of applied tariffs (Gallezot, 2003; Bouët et al, 2004b).  
Recent measures show that obstacles to exports from developing countries are significant in Japan, 
where preferential systems have only a limited effect in agriculture.  The protection level is also higher 
in the EU than in the US (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004).  In the United States (sugar, milk, tobacco), and 
more so in Canada (milk), protection is concentrated in a few sectors. It is more widespread across 
products in the EU.  Indirect protection through subsidies is also pernicious, as in the case of cotton in 
the United States, and assessing Australian protection is difficult as it is essentially non-tariff based. 
Table 1 provides an estimate of applied tariffs for different agricultural sectors, for groups of 
countries.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
Contrasting effects.  Agricultural protection does not have the same effects on every developing 
country. The protectionist nature of the EU, for example, affects particularly South American and 
Asian exporters (Table 2).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
The cost of agricultural protectionism for developing countries.  Agricultural protectionism in the 
North considerably restricts countries in the South according to assessments of the World Bank.  
Abolition of tariffs would see an increase in the order of 20% in agricultural exports from developing 
countries, a source of annual gains of several tens of billions of dollars. However, most other studies  5
show much lower gains.  For example, agricultural protectionism in the North costs developing 
countries some 12 billion dollars (while the protectionism of the Southern countries costs slightly 
more) according to Anderson et al (2001).  Other studies find gains in the order of 4 to 8 billion dollars 
annually (Diao et al 2004 ; Tokarick, 2003) in the framework of complete free trade, and gains of 
about 1 to 3.5 billion dollars in the case of a lowering by half of the agricultural tariffs in developed 
countries (Francois et al 2003, for example).  These net estimates take into account all impacts, 
including possible unfavorable effects for consumers linked to price rises, and gains for producers in 
developing countries would be higher. 
Most authors conclude that, of the various support measures used in Northern countries (tariffs, 
subsidies to producers, export aids) tariff protectionism is the most harmful to developing countries 
(Hoekman et al, 2002).  While Bouët et al (2004c) share this conclusion for developing countries as a 
whole, they show that it is not valid for some of the poorest among them.  They maintain that sub 
Saharan Africa suffers more from the domestic support policies of developed countries (cotton in 
particular) than from their tariff structure due to their preferential access to the EU and US markets. 
Lowering tariffs in developed countries would actually have negative effects on African countries.  
Bouët et al (2004c) show that a reduction in multilateral tariffs in developed countries would generate 
an erosion of preferences detrimental to African countries.  That is, their work tempers optimism on 
the effects of trade liberalization for developing countries as a whole. 
3. Preferences granted to developing countries 
If sub Saharan Africa risks not benefiting much from lowered tariffs in a multilateral framework, it is 
because it benefits from preferential access to the European market under the Cotonou Agreement 
with African-Caribbean-Pacific countries (ACP) and to the US market under the AGOA (African 
Growth and Opportunity Act).  Most other countries only benefit from the GSP, which has limited 
coverage for agricultural produce even if the EU, USA and Japan grant the Least Developed Countries 
a markedly more favorable regime, as in the EU EBA (Everything But Arms) initiative. 
Preferential trade under attack.  While these preferences offer commercial potential to developing 
countries, they are nonetheless much criticized.  Preferences are said to be are poorly utilized, in part 
because the rules of origin governing eligibility to these preferences are said to be so restrictive that 
they largely limit their benefits (Brenton, 2003).  Preferences are said to be tied to restrictive or 
debatable conditions, subject to frequent changes, and therefore fail to provide the stable environment 
necessary to develop production (Panagaryia, 2003).  Preferences are also said to divert trade between 
developing countries and to create as many losers as winners.  It is even claimed that preferences have 
no or even a negative effect on growth and delay growth-promoting reforms (Ozden and Reihnardt; 
2003, Topp, 2004).  Finally, preferences are also under attack in the World Trade Organization as 
contradicting the basic normative principle of non-discrimination.  While the GSP has a legal status  6
within the WTO (arising from the 1979 GATT "Enabling Clause"), a waiver must be sought for all 
regional preferences which are normally incompatible with the Most Favored Nation clause.  
Preferences rather well utilized.  Is criticism of trade preferences for developing countries justified? 
Several recent studies have made exact estimates of the use of commercial preferences. OECD (2004), 
Candau et al (2004) and Wainio and Gibson (2003) show that, contrary to a widespread belief, 
commercial preferences granted to developing countries by the EU and the United States are indeed 
put to good use in agricultural products.  Among exports from developing countries, the trade flows 
eligible are essentially exported under these preferences. In both the EU and the US, only a very small 
share (about 11%, see Tables 3 and 4) of eligible agricultural products were exported outside a 
preferential regime.  These rare cases of eligible exports under the Most Favored Nation regime are 
largely explained by small trade flows and/or low MFN tariffs which means that the importer did not 
judge it worthwhile to meet the eligibility criteria.  Studies inferring poor use of preferences might be 
valid in some other sectors than agriculture, but they do not match the available data for the 
agricultural, food and fisheries sector.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
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This does not mean that tariff preferences are likely to give rise to large trade flows.  There are 
situations where exports from developing countries are insignificant.  This is very much the case of 
African countries’ exports to the United States, despite the granted preferences.  The explanation for 
this is to be sought in problems of competitiveness or in poor compliance with sanitary standards or 
plant disease controls more so than in the side conditions of preferential agreements (OECD, 2004). 
Rules of origin. Rules of origin are intended to avoid the simple transhipment of goods with little local 
processed value added benefiting from preferential access.  Rules of origin prevent misuse of 
preference schemes.  Arguably, they reinforce the benefit of the scheme for the preference-receiving 
country by creating an incentive for third countries to invest there so as to benefit from preferential 
market access.  In the textile sector, however, over-restrictive rules prevent non-cotton producing 
countries from exporting apparel and garments (under preferences granted by the United States (non-
cotton producing countries must work with American cotton in order to export tee-shirts within the 
preference regime). Rules of origin undoubtedly account for the under-utilization of preferences in the 
textile and clothing sector (Inama, 2003; Candau et al, 2004).  Rules of origin are also an obstacle to 
the development of processing, particularly in fisheries (the origin is linked here to the catching 
regions, posing difficulties for tuna processors to supply themselves all year round in countries with 
limited maritime area).   7
In the agricultural sector, the problem is less severe.  A large proportion of the exports of developing 
countries are primary goods not affected by the rules of origin.  While the clauses on a "sufficient" 
degree of transformation prevent, for example, a country from refining imported sugar and dispatching 
it in the framework of preferential agreements such as the EBA initiative, this avoids an abuse of the 
philosophy of the agreement.  Some small countries do experience problems justifying enough local 
content and being able to export processed foods.  But, in most cases, other obstacles (technical 
standards, poor infrastructure) appear at least as restrictive as rules of origin, if we are to believe 
enquiries carried out among processors (Bureau et al, 2004).  The main problem posed by EU rules of 
origin is the lack of cumulation possibilities among countries that benefit from the GSP, except within 
a handful of regional groupings.  Allowing further cumulation (i.e. considering material used by 
country A and originating from country B as "local" provided that country A and B are both eligible 
for the EU preference) would make it easier to make use of the GSP.  In the case of the EBA, 
cumulation with all other developing (and perhaps neighboring) countries would be necessary, 
because cumulation would bring little advantage if it were restricted to LDCs. 
Discriminatory Clauses. Several developing countries have protested in the WTO Trade Policy 
Reviews against the "graduation" provisions of the EU and US GSP which limit preferential access for 
countries which are "too" competitive in one product.  The idea is, for example, not to allow Argentina 
to supply all imports of beef under a preferential regime but to share export opportunities among a 
larger number of developing countries.  Thus a country exporting above a certain threshold is excluded 
from the preference for a given product, or all products.  Middle-income developing countries, in 
particular, criticize such provisions as an obstacle to the expression of their comparative advantage.  
Nonetheless, the EU graduation system is based on a formula taking account of the degree of a 
country’s development, and is coherent with the need, evident to us, of evolving towards a special and 
differential treatment which is more subtle than the plain "developed/developing" dichotomy.  
There are also criticisms of initiatives which grant more favorable treatment to some countries, either 
because they are fighting drug trafficking (EU, US) or because they are more diligent than others 
regarding the environment and human rights (GSP of the EU).  India recently won a WTO panel 
dispute against the extra EU GSP preferences granted to countries fighting drug trafficking (after the 
preferences were granted to Pakistan, for largely political reasons).  Conditionality of preferences is 
defensible on some grounds, and is arguably necessary to prevent preferences from being diluted by 
extending them to an excessively large number of countries.  But the unilateralism of such 
conditionality paves the way for arbitrariness and political influence. As long as it is not based on 
"objective" and widely accepted criteria, such conditionality is not WTO-compatible, and would raise 
more problems than it might solve.  This is the sense of the Appelate Body ruling on the dispute about 
the European GSP for countries fighting drugs.  Whether well-suited modalities can be found to make 
such principle applicable without perverse consequences remains an open question.   8
Are preferences ineffective and would their erosion be harmless? It is difficult to evaluate the impact 
of preferences on growth and development. The European Commission itself expressed serious doubts 
on the benefits of the ACP preferential regime during the design of the Cotonou agreement.  However, 
statistical studies showing the inutility of preferences are not particularly convincing (Ozden and 
Reinhardt, 2003; Stockel and Borrell, 2001).  Perhaps the situation would have been much worse 
without preferences.  Moreover, several recent studies contradict assertions of the ineffectiveness of 
preferences as development aid. In a very detailed study of African countries, Stevens and Kennan 
(2004) show that preferences "are used and work" on a global scale, and that the problems are caused 
more by the limitations of these preferences (inadequate coverage, restrictive conditions, rules of 
origin, problems of technical standards imposed on tariff issues, etc).  Clearly, some trade flows would 
not have taken place without these preferences. This is confirmed by Wainio and Gehlhar (2004) who 
also show that exports fell when preferences have been eroded by the lowering of MFN tariffs.  A 
recent statistical study conducted over a wide sample of countries even suggests that countries which 
benefit from the American and/or European GSP on average have experienced significant extra 
growth (Romalis, 2003).  
There remain important questions for which precise information is lacking.  This is true for the extent 
of the real benefits to developing countries, and more so for the sharing of these benefits.  What 
exactly are the repercussions of the ACP agreements for various categories of the population? How are 
the quota rents distributed?  What are the indirect effects (corruption) of import or export license 
allocation?  It is not known precisely if this "Trade for Aid" is more effective than more direct 
assistance policies, the consequences, for example of the banana and sugar protocols being 
controversial on this point.  Excessive criticism of preferential regimes seems to be made in order to 
avoid the defense of preferences being used as an obstacle to multilateral liberalization (Anderson 
2005).  By doing so, one takes the risk of depriving many developing countries of assistance which 
may be quite effective.  
In addition, skepticism about the benefit drawn from preferences does not imply that their removal 
would be harmless. Various authors have argued that erosion of non-reciprocal preferences is a 
problem of limited magnitude at the worldwide level, focused on a handful of products and on a 
limited number of countries (see e.g. Subramanian, 2003; Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004). However, 
Bouët et al (2005) argue that the magnitude of forthcoming difficulties for poor countries has been 
understated.  According to their estimates, 14 countries earned in 2001 tariff quota rents worth more 
than half a percentage point of their GDP (more than one point in 8 countries).  Their calculation also 
shows that the "true" average preferential margin in agriculture is higher than 1 point for 47 
developing countries, and higher than 2 points for 33 countries.  Bouët et al stress that preferential 
schemes such as the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement or the US-Caribbean Basin Initiative are of 
particular importance for beneficiary countries.  The erosion of preferences is likely to be a major  9
challenge for several African and Caribbean countries, whose export specialization is in large part 
shaped by preferences. Sugar, bananas, textiles and clothing, and meat products play a central role, but 
these products are key to numerous developing countries. 
Furthermore, the poor countries concerned generally have a very low adjustment capacity due to the 
combination of an often-deficient capital market, of the existence of many obstacles to labor mobility, 
of the absence of safety nets and of training capacities, etc.  They might well face severe difficulties 
when trying to reallocate part of their production factors toward other sectors.  Contraction of internal 
demand is often the only domestic way for them to adjust to external imbalances.  
4. The impact of agricultural subsidies 
Many authors believe that tariff protection in Northern countries is the problem which most handicaps 
Southern countries.  Bouët et al (2004c) present a more ambiguous perspective.  For example, with 
respect to sub-Saharan Africa, subsidies to US and EU producers in cotton, but also in tobacco and 
peanuts, have a bigger negative impact than tariffs on world prices, on exchange rates and even on 
general welfare.  
Farm aid increasingly decoupled. Recent agricultural policy reforms have been characterized by a 
move of farm support towards payments which are less tied to the quantity produced.  Payments 
coupled to production count for only marginal quantities in the EU or in the US in many sectors.  
However, "green box" payments (which, in WTO terms, refers to transfers to farmers which are not 
dependent on either current prices or the quantity produced) are now very significant. NGOs such as 
Oxfam argue that decoupling is only a cosmetic revamping of support which remains at the same level 
(Watkins, 2004). 
Do these decoupled payments really have a negative impact on the Southern countries?  Opinion is 
divided, and detailed econometric studies are very limited. Several studies make it clear that to give a 
sum of money, even unconditionally, to a farmer necessarily influences the amount produced (Chavas 
and Holt, 1990; Sumner, 2003).  In reducing the risk of insolvency, even decoupled payments 
encourage higher production or riskier cultivation.  There is necessarily an implicit anticipation that 
cultivated areas will be used as a reference in the next reform which drives land into cultivation.  But 
there are few solid quantitative results on the effect of such aid on production (Adams et al, 2001).  In 
the EU, the decoupling is only partial, and what is more the single premium remains conditional on the 
maintenance of the land in good agricultural condition.  If one accepts the rule of thumb  used by 
many model builders (for lack of more exact assessments) that decoupled payments have about one 
third of the production impact of coupled payments, the impact of some 30 billion euros of EU direct 
aid is far from neutral on the world market and thus on developing countries.  
Developing countries and the green box.  During the Doha negotiations, developing countries have 
attempted to call the "green box" into question.  If decoupled payments could not be exempted from  10
the calculation of the total "Aggregate Measure of Support " used to put a ceiling on permitted aid, this 
would put the EU and US authorities in serious trouble vis-à-vis their farmers.  They have presented 
the reforms towards more decoupled payment as a way to comply with WTO disciplines. However, 
the criteria for current green box eligibility are debatable and it is likely that the developing countries 
will resume the offensive on this point.  The recent WTO panel finding on American cotton subsidies 
which recognized the validity of the arguments contesting the decoupling of aid to US cotton could 
encourage a more offensive stance.  The same argument could also be applied to the aid which the EU 
classifies in the green box, even after the recent reform of June 2003.  
5. Export subsidies  
EU export refunds. EU resistance to renouncing export subsidies has been one of the main blocking 
points during the Doha agricultural negotiations.  At an economic level, export subsidies are a very 
inefficient support instrument.  Indeed, a large share of money spent by the taxpayer benefits foreign 
consumers (Bureau et al, 2003). However, for the EU, renouncing the possibility of subsidizing 
exports is the same as renouncing the maintenance of an intervention price structurally higher than 
world prices:  European "refunds" are the keystone of the joint organizations of the market.
  The 
August 2004 agreement foresees the ending of export subsidies, although without an exact date.  It is 
likely that this will require further adjustments in the CAP, and in particular a further decrease in 
intervention prices.  
Beyond its symbolism, have export subsidies (essentially EU subsidies in the last few years), had a 
very negative impact on developing countries?  Such subsidies face strong criticism from various 
NGOs who highlight the unfair and harsh competition in some industries: beef and poultry in West 
Africa, milk in Jamaica or in India.  These effects are real, especially as the amounts concerned can 
vary considerably from one year to the next according to the quantities which must be removed from 
the European market to support prices.  However, they are not uniform. Developing countries which 
are net importers of food largely abstained from condemning too openly these export subsidies during 
the Doha round.  
A recent study by Gallezot and Bernard (2004) reviewed the amounts and destinations of European 
export subsidies. It shows that they vary considerably according to the product but also to the 
destination.  According to this study, subsidies are principally aimed at countries that are dependent on 
imports.  It is difficult, however, to assess the responsibility of these subsidies for the inability of local 
farmers to develop local adequate agricultural production and it is undeniable that the subsidies are 
unfair competition for other potential suppliers.  
The end of export refunds. European subsidies have clearly limited trade in the South, depriving some 
countries with significant production potential from markets in nearby countries. In some sectors, such 
as West African beef, these subsidies frequently represent half the cargo value.  Nevertheless, overall,  11
the NGO stress on export subsidies appears unbalanced given the global effect of refunds.  The 
removal of subsidies would not greatly alter the situation for developing countries, except for the 
particular cases underlined by the NGOs.  The assessments of Bouët et al (2004c) suggest that such 
removal will have an important effect on the world price only in the sugar and dairy product sectors.  
The end of refunds will hardly have any impact on those developing countries which sell their sugar 
higher than the world price in the framework of preferential quotas.  With dairy produce, only some 
developing countries like Argentina have a definite comparative advantage. Subsidized exports of 
milk affect essentially West Africa, which historically does not have significant production potential 
regarding the needs of the population.  In short, the removal of such subsidies is desirable to end unfair 
competition, but the overall positive effect on developing countries must not be overestimated. 
6. The effects of Doha 
The assessment of the effect of the Doha Round by Bouët et al (2004c) stands out by the fact that 
preferential regimes granted to developing countries are considered very carefully, markedly altering 
the conclusions that can be drawn from such exercises for the developing countries.  In particular, this 
study shows that the lowering of MFN duties by Northern countries erodes the preferences granted to 
sub Saharan Africa.  Countries such as Australia or Brazil would then replace the preferential exports 
of Africa, the Caribbean or the Andean countries.  As the August 2004 agreement is imprecise on the 
technical modalities of tariff and internal support reductions, hypotheses were made on the basis of the 
Harbinson draft compromise although this was never accepted by Members (WTO, 2003).  However, 
the simulations carried out should be close enough to those of the final agreement. 
The reduction of internal support would have a more significant effect than other measures in the rice, 
cotton and, to a lesser degree, the cereal and oil crop sectors (Bouët et al, 2004c). In the sugar sector, 
the removal of export subsidies would have the most significant impact. In the other sectors, 
particularly fruit and vegetables, it is the lowering of the tariffs which is most important.  
Nevertheless, apart from significant impacts on the world price of rice, milk and sugar, the price 
effects of the Doha round will be small.  Growth in production would certainly occur for developed 
countries in the Cairns group and, to a smaller degree, developing countries of the same group (Brazil, 
Argentina and Thailand particularly).  Considering the effects of erosion of preferences, it is 
principally the exports of the Cairns group (and to a lesser degree, China and the Asian developing 
countries) which would increase, to the detriment of EU exports. African countries would see no 
significant growth in their exports.  
The welfare effects in developing countries presented in Table 5 are the combination of changes in the 
terms of trade, allocative efficiency, government revenues, as well as gains for agricultural producers 
and losses for consumers.  In Mediterranean countries and sub-Saharan countries, the welfare effect of 
the Doha Round would be negative.  Other developing countries (Asian and some South American  12
countries) would experience a net increase in welfare, but by a limited amount (Table 5, and Bouët et 
al 2004c for more details).  Some of the poorest countries, or at least some countries that include the 
largest number of the poor, such as India, Pakistan or Bangladesh (part of "South Asia" in Table 5) 
experience a slight increase in welfare, mainly due to allocative efficiency gains generated by the 
elimination of their own domestic distortions. However, others, also among the poorest, experience 
welfare losses.  This is the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes many of the least developed 
countries. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
Note that the farm sector in Sub-Saharan Africa benefits from higher world prices, even though trade 
liberalization hurts consumers.  This is not the case in South Asia, because of larger cuts in 
agricultural tariffs (an indication of the effects on the farm sector is given by the returns to agricultural 
land in Table 5. See Bouët et al 2004c for more details).  
The figures for Sub-Saharan Africa and Mediterranean countries (where the significant increase in the 
world price of cotton has a negative effcet on the textile industry) show contrasting effects of 
agricultural liberalization both within and between developing countries (Table 5).  Recent studies 
focusing on the poverty impact of trade liberalization, which combine household surveys with 
economic models, indeed show the uneven consequences on different population groups.  Welfare 
gains at the national level can even be compatible with a larger number number of people below the 
poverty level (Bussolo et al, 2004; Valenzuela et al, 2005). 
7. Non tariff isssues and developing countries  
Northern protectionism, competition distortions due to subsidies, and preferences too restrictive to be 
efficient are the usual reasons cited explaining the poor trade performance of developing countries.  
And yet, as we have seen, rigorous studies show that preferences granted to developing countries are 
put to quite good use (OECD, 2004; Candau et al, 2004); and that export subsidies of Northern 
countries have, apart from particular cases, only modest global effects on developing countries (Bouët 
et al, 2004c).  Surveys of importers show that, in the case of African countries, customs duties are not 
considered major obstacles to the development of an export industry to the EU, particularly because of 
the ACP and EBA agreements.  Nor do these surveys suggest that tariff escalation is an obstacle to the 
local processing of products for export (Bureau et al, 2004).  Rules of origin to take advantage of 
preferences are cited as a problem in a minority of cases only. 
How then can it be that the developing countries, particularly the poorest, have such difficulty 
integrating themselves into international trade?  The share of developing countries in world agri-food  13
exports has continually decreased, from 40% to 24% in thirty years.  Sub-Saharan Africa’s market 
share has gone from 9% to less than 3%, and consists essentially of lightly processed products.  
One reason is that developing countries have largely remained outside the phenomenon of intra-
regional liberalization, which has increased trade within large areas of the world (EU, NAFTA).  
Neither African nor Asian regional integration has been very convincing and Mercosur’s integration 
has been incomplete.  Overall, developing countries continue to impose often very high tariffs among 
themselves, often adding non transparent import taxes and a multiplicity of bureaucratic obstacles.  
Another reason for the lack of integration into the world market is because technical, sanitary and 
plant disease controls restrict agricultural and food exports from a large number of developing 
countries.  These problems are particularly acute with primary products, due to measures against 
epidemics, contagious diseases or invasive species.  For example, the EU prohibited the import of 
African fish and shellfish at the end of the 1990s for fear of cholera, severely handicapping one of this 
region’s few dynamic sectors.  Numerous countries that are not deemed to be free of foot and mouth 
disease cannot export animal products: for these, the opening of markets by an agreement within the 
Doha Round would be largely theoretical.  The phytosanitary barriers to the importation of fruit and 
vegetables are very restrictive and sometimes unpredictable, and lead to penalizing retention periods 
(even though the EU is less extreme than Japan or Australia, see OECD, 1999).  
New EU sanitary controls could have a particularly severe impact on the exports of African countries 
(Cerrex 2003).  Several of the controls, particularly on traceability and responsibility, maximum 
pesticide residues and on the implementation of hygiene procedures to critical levels, could result in 
smaller exports from ACP countries.  They could particularly affect developing country exports in the 
seafood and the fruits and vegetable sectors.  It is these countries with very limited infrastructures, 
financial resources and human capital that risk being removed from the list of countries exporting to 
the EU. 
It might be thought that sanitary and pest control problems, especially questions of microbe 
contamination and invasive species, would be less of a problem for processed products.  These, 
however, do not gain easier entry to the European or American market. Indeed, standards imposed by 
the developed countries often concern the processing chain and not only the final quality of the 
product (Henson et al 2000).  Food firms must observe the technical standards and Hazard Analysis at 
Critical Control Points procedures which pose problems of cost, infrastructure and traceability for 
developing countries.  
It is easily understood that, with public opinion so sensitive on matters of food safety, caution 
encourages very restrictive measures.  However, the fact is that technical conditions placed on the 
exports of developing countries are de facto obstacles which limit the effects of lowering customs 
tariffs.   14
An unprofitable discipline for developing countries.  It is not easy to distinguish whether controls 
mainly shelter local producers from competition or are required to protect human, plant or animal 
health (OECD, 1999).  The work of Fontagné and Mimouni (2001) is one of the few assessments of 
the economic effects of non-tariff barriers.
  It shows that Europe and the United States impose 
restrictive standards.  But so do other countries which advocate lower tariffs but where it is more 
difficult to export. Ironically, besides Japan, it is in the Cairns group that obstacles to trade appear 
most widespread, notably in Latin America (Mercosur particularly), Australia and New Zealand.  
When these standards are excessively restrictive, the WTO provides tools to challenge them.  The SPS 
Agreement (on sanitary and phytosanitary standards) states that more restrictive controls than those 
based on international standards must have scientific justification based on risk analysis.  The 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade governs regulations dealing with subjects other than 
human, plant and animal health (governed by the SPS Agreement).  These agreements have allowed 
measures to be challenged whose main motivation is the protection of local producers (Josling et al, 
2004).  The SPS agreement has also played an important role in prompting governments to base their 
controls on a more objective assessment of risks (numerous disputes have also been resolved without 
the necessity for a panel).  Much maligned from the outset, this agreement is no longer really criticized 
since the appeal body established a balanced jurisprudence, leaving room for cautionary attitudes in 
the absence of established risk (OECD, 1999).  
Nevertheless, the SPS Agreement has a limited use for developing countries, which have made only 
infrequent use of it to open markets. As in all recourse to the Dispute Settlement Body, there is a 
problem of funding.  The agreement favors countries which have accumulated significant expertise in 
the field of scientific evaluation used in arbitration cases.  On the other hand, the SPS agreement does 
not really consider economic aspects.  Cost benefit analysis plays only a small part.  There is indeed an 
article in the SPS agreement which alludes to taking account of economic effects, and these are 
considered beforehand in setting international standards (in the Codex Alimentarius for example).  But 
the presence of pathogens, however small, can justify measures to reduce the very small risk (from the 
moment it becomes real) even if the consequences are very costly for third world country.
  
The increasing significance of private standards.  Perhaps a more significant phenomenon is that the 
standards governing international (and national) trade are increasingly beyond public control, which 
alone is capable of being the subject of international agreements. Increasingly, private players are 
imposing their own standards on importers and producers from developing countries (Reardon, 2004).  
These requirements exceed public regulations, particularly regarding production processes, 
certification and traceability, three areas where the poorest countries are especially handicapped by the 
lack of capital, infrastructure and skilled workers.  Moreover, private sector standards appear to 
amplify the effects of reputation, distributors in developed countries having not only to manage the 
risk but the media coverage of risk with public opinion.  For example, in a recent survey, cases were  15
reported where buyers (those involved in school meals) systematically refused supplies from 
developing countries despite a seemingly satisfactory bill of health (frozen fish, Bureau et al, 2004).  
In other cases, doubts about the reliability of national certifications meant that importers preferred to 
process fruit and vegetables in Europe (including Central Europe, for subsequent export to Western 
Europe) rather than in Africa.  All the more so as the new EU states, and not the developing countries, 
have benefited from aid to improve their infrastructures.  This has relatively hampered processors who 
invested in African countries who themselves had to adapt their factories to the new regulations. 
In short, there is a set of factors not pertaining to trade negotiation which considerably limit the 
integration of developing countries into the world market.  Direct foreign investment is often an 
efficient way to meet quality, control and traceability requirements in Northern markets.  But 
investigations show that political instability is a significant hindrance to this type of investment (Côte 
d'Ivoire).  The same investigations (Bureau et al, 2004) show that the difficulty of dealing with often 
only theoretical companies, which do not deliver goods or suddenly disappear and where contracts are 
often subject to corruption, is an obstacle to trade development with several West African countries 
(often mentioned in the case of Nigeria for example).  
Again, not all developing countries are affected in the same way.  Agribusiness professionals in 
Argentina and Brazil are fully confident of their capacity to respond to all EU technical and sanitary 
requirements in the near future, even if those on traceability pose some problems for them (it also 
poses problems for other developed countries).  In short, non-tariff factors seem to marginalize the 
poorest countries the most, and sub Saharan Africa in particular. 
8. Conclusion 
Recent studies have highlighted the contrasting interests of various types of developing countries 
faced with the perspective of liberalization in the agricultural and food sector.  For most middle-
income developing countries confronted with high protection in the main markets, liberalization can 
be a source of substantial growth in prospects and prices for a relatively high-performing export 
sector.  For poorer countries, on the other hand, rising import prices and the erosion of preferences 
darken the picture considerably.  
The recent growth of criticism of trade preferences doubtless responds to anxieties as to their often 
arbitrary and even, in some cases, harmful character.  Countries excluded from the benefits of such 
agreements can legitimately feel wronged.  The fear of seeing the defense of preferences used in the 
defense of protectionist interests is another reason for distrust. Finally, the argument that preferences 
can only be a short term policy, given the progressive reduction of multilateral tariffs and the reform 
of agricultural policies in developed countries, cannot be ignored.  However, critiques of preferential 
regimes underestimate the growing difficulty of the poorest countries in the export of agricultural  16
produce.  Their marginalization can only increase if no measures are taken in their favor. In this case, 
equality of treatment is not synonymous with fairness.  
In this context, the North-South dichotomy appears simplistic.  The concept of "special and differential 
treatment" symptomizes this.  The eligibility for this favorable WTO treatment depends only on the 
self-declaration of each individual country, even if questioned by other member states.  Among the 
148 WTO members, more than 100 are treated as developing countries.  However, the extent of their 
economic weakness, which special and differentiated treatment is supposed to address, varies greatly. 
The advantages and interests of countries such as China, Brazil or Mexico have not much in common 
with those of the very poor countries of Africa or South Asia.  
This diversity cannot be accommodated by a single measure, and explains in large part the 
dissatisfaction expressed in regard to the present special and differential treatment.  Better 
differentiating between developing countries is necessary to move forward, even if middle-income 
countries are opposed at the moment.  In this perspective, simple reference to historical or 
geographical criteria is arbitrary and ill-suited.  Only a more objective approach, contingent 
exclusively on widely accepted development criteria appears to provide the basis for a redefinition of 
fairness in the international trading system.  The decision of the WTO Appeal Body in April 2004, 
regarding the legitimacy of the preferential regime offered by the EU to some developing countries 
committed to the struggle against drug trafficking, opens the way to such a differentiation, while 
subjecting it to a certain number of restrictions. It must comply with objective criteria, with a 
legitimate need, while ensuring no "undue difficulties" for trade with other members.  This is perhaps 
the beginning of a multi speed system, more adapted to the diversity of situations.  
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Table 1. Average tariffs applied by sector, per cent 
  EU 25  USA  Asia Developed  EFTA  Cairns 
Developed 
Paddy  rice  62.9 4.6  289.9  12.3 0.0 
Processed  rice  138.1 4.9 314.0  11.6  0.0 
Coarse  grains  24.3 1.1 83.9  82.6 0.1 
Wheat 0.5  2.4  69.2  134.4  1.2 
Sugar  128.5 34.8 120.4 48.2  3.5 
Oilseeds  0.0  4.3 62.4  38.5 0.1 
Live  animals  36.2 0.1 20.4  53.6 0.0 
Animal  products  4.3 0.6 9.9  33.7  8.3 
Meat  62.8 3.2 25.2  177.6  5.9 
Meat  products  20.0 3.6 31.8  167.9  30.4 
Dairy  products  39.6 18.8 40.2 91.7 76.6 
Fibers  0.0 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Fruits  &  vegetables  17.9 2.7 17.1  31.8 1.7 
Other  crops  2.3 2.7 3.7  20.0  1.4 
Fats  4.6 3.5 4.2  36.2  2.1 
Beverage  Tobacco  13.7 2.4 13.1  15.9 7.2 
Food  10.1 4.2 12.6  20.8 6.8 
Total  agrofood  16.7 4.7 22.5  47.7  10.8 
Source: MacMap_HS6,using  ad valorem equivalents. The figures indicate the percentage tariff, weighted by the exports of a 
reference group of countries so as to account for the relative importance of each product without suffering from the well 
known endogeneity bias of regular trade weighted averages. See Bouët et al 2004b.  
 
 
Table 2. Average applied bilateral tariffs in the agricultural sector, per cent 
Tariffs applied  by Æ 
 
applied to ↓ 
EU 25  USA  Asia developed  EFTA  Cairns 
developed 
EU  25  -  5.8  22.2 52.0 15.7 
USA  16.2 - 28.9  57.9  5.1 
Asia  developed  12.5 3.7  -  17.9 6.2 
EFTA  7.9  3.9  11.6 - 10.6 
Cairns  developed  25.9 3.4 24.9  79.8  - 
Mediterranean  7.3  4.0 14.1  25.7 3.7 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6.7  3.0 12.0 8.9  0.7 
Cairns  developing  18.3 3.8 24.0  34.7 5.9 
China  13.5 5.1 21.7  36.7 8.7 
South  Asia  14.4 1.8 33.7  21.9 1.8 
Rest of the World  15.1  2.1  17.4  25.8  2.6 
Average  16.7 4.7 22.5  47.7  10.8 








Imports eligible, by 





of utilization  
Effective rate 
of utilization  




[1] [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]    [2]/(sum[2] 
Total  4 136 950  3 606 911  87%    6.2% 
AGOA  161 928  137 202  85%  85%  0.2% 
ATPA  959 224  408 319  43%  65%  0.7% 
CBERA-CBTPA  1 689 600  1 629 023  96%  99%  2.8% 
GSP (regular)  2 455 655  1 415 038  58%  94%  2.4% 
GSP-LDCs  83 010*  17 329  21%  87%  0.0% 
       
RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES            
NAFTA   11 616 292  11 531 469  99%    19.8% 
Other  147 179  143 836  98%    0.2% 
       
NON PREFERENTIAL             
Duty free (under MFN)  29 046 869      49.8% 
MFN (tariff >0)    14 039 056      24.1% 
           
Total US Import     58 368 141      100% 
* excluding eligibility to regular GSP. Source: computation by authors from USITC data, based on CIF imports for 2002, 
chapters 1 to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilization is constructed as the ratio of imports under any preference to 
the imports eligible for a given preference. ATPA indicates the Andean Trade Preference Act. NAFTA indicates the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. MFN stands for Most Favored Nation. 
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Actual Import under 
regime 
1000 Euros 
Apparent rate of 
utilization 
 





 [1]  [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]    [2]/(sum[2] 
Non reciprocal 
regimes 
       
Total  18 609 825  12 292 289  89%     
Cotonou (ACP)  5 926 849  5 500 091  92.8%  95%  8.3% 
GSP (regular)  8 754 532  4 385 644  50.1%  86%  6.6% 
GSP-Drug  1 833 684  1 714 354  93.5%  95%  2.6% 
E.B.A   1 682 244  293 527  17.4%  96%  0.4% 
OCT  412 516  398 673  96.6%    0.6% 
         
RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES 
Maghreb (MGB)   1 096 733  1 046 009  95.4%    1.6% 
Machrak  112 473  106 928  95.1%    0.2% 
Balkan  356 428  329 575  92.5%    0.5% 
PEC's  2 570 731  1 937 165  75.4%    2.9% 
Economic European 
Area  
1 973 938  1 085 880  55.1%    1.6% 
Other  5 270 602  4 222 484  80.1%    6.3% 
         
NON PREFERENTIAL 
Duty free (under MFN)  21 713 889      32.6 
MFN (tariff >0)    4 200 067      6.3 
         
Total Import EU    66 558 853      100 
Source: Computations by J. Gallezot, from Taxud (Single administrative declaration) and TARIC data, based on CIF imports 
data for 2002, chapters 1 to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilization is constructed as the ratio of imports under any 
preference to the imports eligible to a given reference. GSP Drug indicates the special GSP provisions for countries 
combating drug trafficking. OCT indicates the overseas territories. PECs indicates the countries benefiting from an 
association agreements. MFN stands for Most Favored Nation  
 
 
Table 5. Impact of an agreement on agriculture in the Doha round (percentage changes 
compared to a 2005 reference) 
  Changes in food 
and agricultural 
production 
Agri-food Exports  Agri-food Imports  Returnsn to 
agricultural land 
Changes in global 
welfare 
EU  25  -1.57  2.7  12.8 -15.06 0.14 
USA  -1.05 0.8  2.8 -0.21  0.05 
Asia  Developed  -2.08 11.8  9.6  -1.79 0.05 
EFTA -2.73  -3.8  3.7  1.10  -0.11 
Cairns  Developed  3.66 12.8  2.8  1.08 0.04 
Mediterranean 0.73  8.8  -1.5  0.77  -0.16 
Cairns  Developing  1.25 10.4 -0.7 0.60 0.00 
China  0.01 13..2 10.1 0.30 0.15 
RoW 0.64  6.8  -0.7  1.15  -0.10 
South  Asia  -0.01 6.4  7.8 -0.10  0.17 
SubSaharan Africa  0.76  4.7  -0.8  0.22  -0.03 
World -0.39  6.1  6.0  -  0.08 
Source : Bouët et al 2004c. 
 